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50 Abstract
Fiscal democracy is the capacity of the legislature to make budgetary choices in 
response to the emerging needs of citizens. This study indicates that, in Middle 
Eastern countries, there are specific limitations to fiscal democracy in the process 
of law-making: most notably the lack of attention to financial impact assessments 
(FIAs). Without systematic FIAs, mandatory out-of-budget allocations are inad-
vertently included in public spending, as they do not require parliamentary 
approval within the regular budgeting process. The low level of effective citizens’ 
engagement in the process of law-making worsens the situation. Budgetary deci-
sions are not well informed by national priorities and preferences. This study uti-
lizes the dataset of the Open Budget Index (OBI) to measure the quality of the 
law-making process of the budget law in a sample of Middle Eastern countries. 
The study concludes with recommendations on mapping the law-making process 
to increase budget transparency. 
Keywords: fiscal democracy, mandatory spending, Financial Impact Assessments, 
citizens’ engagement, law-making process, budget transparency
1 INTRODUCTION
Parliaments’ capacity to respond to the emerging needs of citizens by utilizing 
budgetary resources and reallocating public expenses is a key pillar of the demo-
cratic practices in modern economies. In this regard, fiscal transparency, whereby 
budgetary information is available for public discussions and effective communi-
cations with citizens, is a critical factor that empowers parliaments to make 
informed budgetary decisions (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Alt and Lassen, 2003; 
Shah, 2007; Harrison and Sayogo, 2014; Williams, 2015; Zuccolotto and Teixeira, 
2014; Sarr and Friedman, 2016; Renzio and Wehner, 2017). Hence, a lot of inter-
est has been directed to the determinants of enhanced fiscal transparency.
Budget classification, the timely availability of budget documents, the openness 
of the discussion process to the public and the strength of the roles of supervisory 
agencies are among the factors included in the Open Budget initiative through its 
survey to assure fiscal transparency (IBP, 2017). Countries in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region are part of this worldwide movement towards fiscal 
transparency, legislatures’ empowerment, openness and citizens’ engagement.
However, a critical factor that restricts fiscal transparency in the MENA region is 
the considerable mandatory out-of-budget expenditures. They are mirrored by 
expenses that are not voted on, as they do not require parliamentary approval 
within the annual budgeting process, e.g. wages and salaries, pensions, debt ser-
vice, etc. Such expenditures reduce budget flexibility and responsiveness to the 
dynamics of development. This is mostly attributed to law-making legacies that 
accumulate over time, constraining the discretion of parliaments to respond to 
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51Conducting comprehensive Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs) includes 
reviewing whether proposed policies match national priorities as well as whether 
they are affordable and meet value for money criteria is essential in protecting 
budget flexibility. Given the importance of this topic, the World Bank produced 
the Global Indicators of Regulatory Impact Assessment Governance to highlight 
international efforts in this direction (World Bank, 2016). Most of the work on 
RIAs in the MENA region is still directed to business, trade and the private sector. 
The financial impact of law-making is touched upon but has never been the focus 
of discussion. 
This study contributes to the existing literature by introducing a new measure of 
fiscal transparency that investigates the budget law through a RIA lens. It provides 
a measure of the extent to which governments interact with the public across the 
life cycle of the budget process, evaluating the mechanisms to do so, and efforts 
made to solicit the results of public consultation. Further, the study sheds light on 
the dependency relationships between the diverse dimensions of fiscal transpar-
ency by directing attention to the notion of effective transparency.
This study aims to raise awareness about a budget law as the financial framework 
that reflects the quality of the process of law-making. Specifically, it seeks answers 
to three questions: (i) what is the level of fiscal discretion the parliaments in 
MENA have over the allocation of budget resources, (ii) how effective is the 
financial regulatory impact assessment of law-making in controlling the financial 
impact of the new policies on the budget, and (iii) what are the features estab-
lished in the Budget Law-making process to control the impact of policies intro-
duced in the budget. 
The study focuses on the MENA region with closer review of three country case 
studies; Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia, to provide an in-depth perspective on current 
practices. The analysis remains applicable to other countries and regions. Two of 
the case studies, Tunisia and Egypt, are “Arab Spring” countries where mass pro-
tests called for inclusiveness, openness and fairness. The call spread quickly to a 
few countries, among which was Jordan, before eventually impacting all countries 
in the region. The three selected countries have pioneered parliamentary practices 
within MENA, some of them stemming from the first half of the last century. With 
the advent of the Arab spring, they also witnessed changes in legislation and 
amendments to their constitutions to provide more authority to parliaments and a 
wider opening for the engagement of civil society towards an increased voice for 
citizens and transparency (OECD, 2013). For the case studies, the analysis makes 
use of first-hand data collected through in-depth and structured interviews with 
key stakeholders, including members of the parliaments, former ministers, senior 
executives in Ministries of Finance (MoF) in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia in addi-
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52 The study is structured into four sections. Section one presents the increasing 
footprint of public finance and relates it to fiscal decision-making. Section two 
provides information on conducting financial impact assessments. In section 
three, we establish the relationship between RIA transparency with fiscal transpar-
ency. Section four concludes with recommendations.
2 SECTION I: FISCAL TRENDS AND FISCAL DEMOCRACY
2.1 FISCAL TRENDS
Public finance constitutes a large magnitude of GDP across all regions in the 
world. As figure A1 indicates, the percentage of the gross debt to GDP has been 
always high. Given its size and potential impact, the formulation and execution of 
the budget should be carefully examined. Public finance suffers, generally, from 
the common pool problem: it is not always possible to establish a one-to-one cor-
respondence between who pays and who gets the benefit. Additionally, if revenues 
do not cover expenses, there are several options for financing the public debt. 
Along with the cost comes the impact on intergenerational welfare through debt 
servicing and inflationary impacts, which imply a lower capacity to finance future 
service provision. Therefore, the parliamentary process of enacting the budget, in 
addition to the openness of this process to the public, has received a lot of atten-
tion as it determines the distribution of the current impact among different societal 
groups as well as among them and the future generations. 
MENA countries experience the same international trends of growing public 
finance imbalances. Expenditure is growing at a higher pace than revenues, lead-
ing to increases in the financing gap (figure A2). Table A1 confirms that the grow-
ing deficit is not limited to MENA non-oil countries. The oil economies in MENA 
share similar experiences with a narrowing of fiscal space following the collapse 
in oil prices since 2014. This has led to greater attention to financial impacts when 
new policies and legislation are being proposed.
2.2 FISCAL DEMOCRACY
The phenomena of chronic budget deficits and rising public debts are a common 
symptom of explosive mandatory entitlements. By definition, mandatory spend-
ing is composed of budget outlays that are controlled by law other than appropria-
tion acts (Austin and Levit, 2012). Over time, entitlement programs become more 
expensive per beneficiary and may be coupled with increased number of benefi-
ciaries, thereby increasing the burden on available fiscal resources. For the first 
time in the history of the U.S., program entitlements exceeded government reve-
nues in 2009. That is, every dollar of revenue had been committed even before the 
new Congress first walked through the Capitol doors (Steuerle, 2016). In 2010, 
Eugene Steuerle and Tim Roeper introduced the index of fiscal democracy to 
highlight the reduction in the flexibility of fiscal resources of the U.S. because of 
accumulated policy legacies that occupy a large share of the Federal tax revenue 
and leave limited room for discretionary expenditures. Streeck (2010) applied the 
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53there’s no formal distinction between mandatory and discretionary spending in 
Germany (i.e. legislators vote on the entire budget). Yet, Streeck recognized at 
least four categories in the German federal budget, beside interest payments, that 
are de facto mandatory. 
The idea is not new that “policy legacies” may accumulate over time, constraining 
the choices of elected governments and parliaments and diminishing the capacity of 
states to respond to emerging social problems (Streeck, 2010). The policy legacy 
that they inherit is carried forward by institutional commitments grounded in laws, 
organizations, and budgets that are more important than the preferences of individu-
als (Rose, 1990). From the standpoint of legislators, accumulated policy legacies – 
in the form of mandatory programs – hinder their capacity to allocate the govern-
ment revenues in a way that satisfies the current public needs. Steurele and Roeper’s 
index measures the percentage of federal tax revenues that is not allocated to man-
datory spending. A fiscal democracy index can be thought of as a measure of the 
extent to which yesterday’s legislators dictate tomorrow’s budgetary allocations. 
It measures the decision space opened for legislatures to reflect public priorities 
through the reallocation of public spending among different sectors and policies, 
and willing to make hard political decisions which in many developing societies 
could be seen as far reaching. A fiscal democracy index is calculated as the remain-
ing balance of the percentage of total government revenues that is devoted to pay-
ing the mandatory expenses in the form of wages and salaries and interest 
expenses. At the top of mandatory expenses come civil service wages and pen-
sions and interest payments. They are out of budget decisions. Other expenses 
have a quasi-obligatory nature such as subsidies which have a high political pro-
file and once enacted are extremely difficult to amend in our three country cases. 
They constitute part of the profile of the social contract. Therefore, we present two 
versions of the fiscal democracy index, without and with subsidies. Additionally, 
interest payments constitute part of the mandatory spending. 
As shown in figure A3, the fiscal democracy index in Egypt turned to a negative 
number upon the addition of the subsidy component in the budget. So, in order to 
pay subsidies, the government must go further into debt. Accordingly, the major 
part of public expenditure decisions is taken out of the budget, and the fiscal 
democracy index in Egypt declined dramatically. Since the Egyptian revolution of 
January 2011 and the adverse economic and political conditions that followed, 
wage bills have witnessed a dramatic increase due to responses to workers’ strikes 
and demonstrations, the appointment of temporary employees and application of 
the minimum wage policy. Additionally, government spending on subsidies and 
social benefits increased by about 1.7 times during the period 2010-2017 (figure 
A4). On the other hand, tax revenues declined because of political and economic 
instability and decreased economic activity. Egypt’s fiscal imbalances have subse-
quently worsened as interest payments have increased more than fourfold during 
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54 This pattern also applies, albeit less acutely, to Jordan and Tunisia. Fiscal consoli-
dation efforts in Jordan have started to yield positive results. However, subsidy 
expenditures constitute a persisting issue. The government wage bill in Tunisia is 
relatively high, taking up more than 60 percent of government revenues and 50 
percent of expenditures. The wage bill to GDP ratio has grown by 4.0 percentage 
points between 2010 and 2017, and reached 14.7 percent of GDP in 2017, exclud-
ing 0.4% of GDP in tax credits given to public employees. The wage bill to GDP 
ratio is expected to reach 13.9 percent of GDP in 2018. In comparison, govern-
ment spending on investment reached 5.5 percent of GDP in 2017. The expected 
decline in the ratio reflects an increase in the GDP growth rate and a deceleration 
in the growth of the wage bill resulting from a recent set of wage bill containment 
measures. Nonetheless, the trend of worsening composition of government expen-
ditures may continue to lead to a cycle of wage bill increases which crowds out 
capital spending, with adverse consequences for spending efficiency and eco-
nomic growth. Figure A4 shows the nominal growth of government spending 
between 2010 and 2016, with a modest growth of capital expenditures compared 
with spending on wages and salaries, which nearly doubled during that period. 
According to the Ministry of Finance, spending on civil service pay will reach 
around 53 percent of primary expenditures in 2018 (52.5 percent in 2017) and 
more than 60 percent of total revenues (excluding grants) over the same year.
To sum up, the growing fiscal deficit in MENA is attributed to the automatic 
increase in mandatory spending, resulting in a situation in which governments are 
financing their functions with debt accumulation (figure A5). In some cases, like 
that of Egypt, the budget experiences real challenges where almost half of the 
expenditure is absorbed by debt service, leaving little room for financing new 
calls. Having almost 90% of the revenues locked into paying for mandatory 
expenses, other social policies in Egypt would be financed with debt. That is to 
say, if in past days, some countries in the region were not concerned with the 
budgetary structure and fiscal trends, from now on the situation is serious enough 
to warrant deep assessment of any action that can be anticipated to have financial 
implications. Hence, parliaments are requested to scrutinize all proposed legisla-
tive acts for their budgetary implications. 
3 SECTION II: REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (RIA)
In this section, the study reviews practices of conducting RIAs in MENA, in a 
comparable context, with a special focus on conducting financial impact assess-
ment of proposed legislations. 
3.1 PRACTICES
Worldwide, there is a growing interest in regulatory reforms including assessing 
the impact of legislation on the economy at large, public finance, and the impact 
on different groups in society such as the business community, households and 
vulnerable groups. In the last three decades, regulatory impact assessment has 
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55are committed to increased transparency and evidence-informed policy-making. 
The history of regulatory impact assessment as a formal regulatory quality tool 
extends over more than 25 years in the OECD (OECD, 2009). In EU countries, 
evaluation of the effectiveness, enforceability and cost of legislation is treated as 
an integral part of the law-making process (Kellermann, 2008). However, the 
practice is still only growing worldwide and not standardized yet in many devel-
oping countries. 
The quality of legislation is affected by the process of law making starting from 
the planning stage through promulgation and release to implementation. An overly 
complex regulatory framework, lack of transparency in the preparation of new 
regulations, plus ineffective and inappropriate application of the rules are all fac-
tors that combine to favour corruption and dishonesty. 
In addition, a transparent process of assessing the impact of legislation on the 
economy is a key advantage of a transparent RIA process as it breaks the circuit 
of asymmetric information that may impact negatively the decision-making power 
of the affected parties. It also allows all parties to voice their opinion and defend 
their interests in a structured manner. Via RIA practices in many countries, the 
assessment studies cover the impact on public health, business environment, 
likely vulnerable groups, and the public sector in financial and administrative 
aspects. The later item relates to the cost of legislation.
The cost of legislation and the efficiency of policies embedded in it, should be 
investigated before any law is passed; with some exceptions, if it is related to 
urgent basic needs like public health and safety. The cost of legislation is critical 
because the budget is neither totally flexible nor perfectly fixed. This means that 
adding or amending policies of and approaches to the conduct of a public service 
would not completely replace existing ones. New policies come with an additional 
cost. The flexibility of the budgeting system depends on the capacity of the gov-
ernment to reallocate resources through prioritization, which entails frequent 
review of policies and hence the legal framework operationalizing them, in addi-
tion to exploring new options to increase public resources. When the budget is 
fully fixed, any new policy will completely displace some existing ones and some 
options that were previously available will be foregone. Therefore, legislation that 
omits a financial impact assessment should be considered to be incompletely 
drafted legislation that may achieve its objectives at an unjustifiable cost instead 
of looking for better options.
Efforts for regulatory reform including RIA, have been of interest in MENA coun-
tries for many years. The business environment, growth and job creation are top 
priorities. More recently, issues of inclusion and citizenship have also emerged. 
However, MENA achievements in RIA practices are still below international 
levels. The latest Global Indicators for Regulatory Governance (GIRG) for 2016 
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56 regulatory impact assessment in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 
compared to the global average (figure A6). MENA on average has the lowest 
score for “no notification of promulgating laws”. The notification and ability of 
citizens and firms to engage with governments on proposed business regulations 
do differ around the world; however, MENA has the lowest regional level of trans-
parency and engagement.
The three case studies vary in their performance related to RIA. Among the high-
est performers in MENA comes Tunisia (table A2). It stands out in three areas of 
RIA: transparency in law accessibility, openness for consultation to the public, 
and conducting impact assessment. Egypt and Jordan also provide access to the 
passed primary laws. In Egypt, this facility is protected by a paywall. Addition-
ally, Jordan has higher score in openness with the public through prior consulta-
tion during the drafting stage.
In Jordan, any new legislation should be published and communicated with the 
public prior to approval. But there are no obligations to include any type of assess-
ments. With the assistance of USAID, Jordan produced draft guidelines for RIA in 
2010. Organic budget law no 58 of 2008, article 4-g, stipulates that part of the 
General Budget Department (GBD) responsibilities is to, “give an opinion on 
draft legislation that has financial impact during the stages of its adoption”. In 
practice, this is only if the PM asks for an opinion. Draft organic budget law of 
2017 makes it mandatory to include a financial RIA in the medium term financial 
framework (MTFF). 
Egypt has a long history of trying to apply RIA, starting with the establishment of 
the National Committee for Review of Economic Legislation by a Prime Ministe-
rial Decree No. 1816/2004 (ERRADA, 2011). In August 2011, a specialized unit 
published “the Egyptian RIA Guidelines” which incorporate both the concept of 
the standard cost of implementing a legislation and also a simple methodology to 
conduct benefit-cost analysis (ERRADA, 2011). Additionally, it has the merit of 
recognizing the importance of consultation with the public during the process of 
preliminary planning for the legislation. However, the Guidelines were not 
adopted because of the prevailing political situation at the time and the unit was 
shut down in 2013. Recently, the Council of Ministers (CoM) decided to add to 
the organization structure of each government agency a new unit to assess the 
impact of its proposed legislation before passing them to the CoM. This is still 
work in progress, however.
In Tunisia, the Prime Minister issued a circular on 27 May 2011 concerning the 
quality of legislation that considers the effectiveness of legal texts and provides 
for impact assessment studies to be carried out as part of the drafting of laws on 
commercial, financial and social matters. Financial studies incorporate both the 
cost and the impact on financing options (OECD, 2013). In practice, the circular 
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57government. Many draft legislative acts have been submitted to the CoM and 
parliament without such documentation in the past few years. More recently, a 
government circular issued in November 2017 clarified guidelines and documents 
that should accompany draft legislation submitted to the council of ministers and 
parliament, with no specific mention of impact assessments.
In conclusion, openness in the planning process was not accompanied by a struc-
tured consultation process. Additionally, while the governments do from time to 
time conduct some form of consultation, the results are not dealt with systemati-
cally or in a transparent manner. Also, feedback is not shown to be taken system-
atically into consideration or to alter the original lines of the legislation to provide 
alternatives and different scenarios.
3.2 FINANCIAL COST OF LEGISLATION
The direct financial cost of implementing legislation is the impact on the budget. 
This has several aspects. First, there is the increased cost of administration, e.g. 
increases in the number of civil servants, with financial implications on the wage 
bill, allowances, and pensions. Another aspect appears in case the legislation pro-
vides for grants or exemptions for households or business. Also, it may have 
implications on the public investment program, like new buildings and construc-
tion. Additionally, it may entail more purchase of goods and services. Impact on 
deficit and financing options through borrowing is another dimension. Transfers 
and subsidies could be impacted as well from the new legislation.
All these impacts should be assessed during the process of law making. Therefore, 
if this process is not strong enough, this may create unforeseen impacts on the 
budget; especially in case of out of budget decisions such as labor compensation 
and interest payments, in addition to socially politized items such as transfers to 
the households. The international experience identifies a seven-step process for a 
normal piece of legislation. It starts with preliminary drafting in the relevant gov-
ernment agency, sharing internally among government agencies, consultations 
with external bodies, passing it to the Council of Ministers (CoM), the parliamen-
tary process, and promulgation by the President and finally reviews the impact. 
Table A3 presents some remarks on this process in the country case studies. When 
the step is compound, we add the financial impact assessment (FIA) in brackets as 
additional information for clarification. 
In Jordan, a Prime Ministerial directive instructed all line ministries to establish a 
legal unit to help in drafting new legislation in terms of providing compelling 
reasons for a legislation as well as annotations that explain that legislation. But no 
direct instruction was issued regarding the assessment of regulatory impact. Law 
no. 56 of 1997 article 3-j stipulates that the MoF give an opinion on draft laws, 
by-laws, agreements, and any other issues that have a financial impact on the 
treasury. But again, no guidelines spell out how this impact should be reviewed. 





















































































43 (1) 49-77 (2019)
58 legislations. No legislation supports MoF in its demand of data from line minis-
tries. On external consultation, a Royal Decree (207) and the Constitution (article 
120) established the Economic & Social Council. It has to advise on all items of 
legislation before passing them. Its 45 members are appointed by the King to rep-
resent all groups of the society. It is independent of the executive branch of the 
government. However, no guidelines were produced to structure the process of 
RIM or to assess the financial dimension. MoF has permanent representative at 
LOB to review any draft law that entails a financial impact.
Similarly, in Egypt, the CoM issued instructions in June 2018 for all government 
agencies to establish as part of its organizational structure, units for legislative 
support including assessing the impact thereof. By law (Organic Budget Law No. 
53 of 1973, #27) all government agencies should alert the MoF if they propose 
any legislation (even for new administrative instructions) that may have a finan-
cial impact. But there are no guidelines to structure the process, so far, it is up to 
the discretionary assessment of government agencies. Additionally, it is discre-
tionary and left to the government agency proposing the legislation. Guidelines on 
how to structure this assessment were overlooked. Unless, the law has a major 
financial impact in the short run, the MoF prefers to investigate the impact through 
the process of the budget preparation. External consultation before Cabinet 
approval on the legislation is not allowed according to the guidelines of the Min-
istry of Justice for drafting laws (Ministry of Justice, 2018). Sometimes the Parlia-
ment conducts discretionary consultation sessions when the legislation affects the 
business community. Recently in 2016, Parliament established a staff training 
center, where RIA is one of the training subjects. The pertinent Plan and Budget 
Committee (PBC) rarely requests the government to provide budgetary impact 
assessments for legislation or request alternative policies rather than those embed-
ded in the proposed laws.
 
Tunisia has, de jure, a different framework. The circular No.14 requires govern-
ment units to conduct impact assessment on draft laws, including a financial 
assessment. In practice, a limited number of laws have applied the RIA system. 
Ministries sponsoring legislation are required to submit draft laws that entail a 
direct impact on the budget to the ministry of finance for consultation. However, 
there is no clear guideline on whether a financial impact assessment is required to 
be submitted for that consultation process.
In the three countries, the approval of the parliament is mandatory to enact the 
legislation. Then the head of the State issued it to be published in the Official 
Gazette. The sequence presented by table A3, shows the process RIA application 
is developing, yet, it is weak for FIA. Moreover, the role of the MoF is not strong 
enough in the process of drafting. As interviews for Egypt indicated, the soft or 
weak roles of finance central agencies (MoF and Planning ministries) delay the 
identification of most of the financial impact to the budget exercise. This may 
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59or discussion in the CM or the parliament to be reviewed and revisited. Besides, 
when the executives present some information on the financial cost of the legisla-
tion, it was observed that it takes the form of the standard costing. Benefit-cost 
analysis and efficiency analysis are missing or incomplete in most cases. This 
limits the ability of the public and the parliament, as well as the CoM, to review 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the legislation, and hence to consider other 
alternatives and options. Benefit/cost analysis is being increasingly widely adopted 
as the formal methodological requirement underpinning RIA within OECD coun-
tries (OECD, 2009). In those countries that consider the financial impact assess-
ment, cost benefit assessment is widely conducted, however, in some of them they 
combine it with cost effectiveness especially when the law targets issues related to 
public health and safety.
In our case studies, while there is no mandatory rule to conduct the assessment 
except in Tunisia, in a few cases we tracked governments presenting the standard 
cost of implementing the proposed law. In Egypt, the MoF presents the financial 
impact of any fiscal law. This impact shows the annual flow of expenses or reve-
nues as of the full implementation of the legislation. While the Macro Fiscal Unit 
in the MoF performs an assessment of this on the fiscal sustainability, it is not 
always presented in the law memorandum to the parliament. This means that the 
impact of the law making on the future budgeting exercise is not well discussed. 
For sectoral laws, the MoF and the Ministry of Planning and Administrative 
Development (MoPAD) are invited sometimes on a discretionary basis to contrib-
ute to the process of preparing sectoral strategies and laws to tap up ahead the 
financial cost and to inform the budget preparation process. Yet, the standard prac-
tice is that the MoF and MoPAD are informed about the new proposed laws (and 
the strategy) through the cabinet, as all sectoral strategies and proposed draft laws 
should be presented to the cabinet for consideration and approval for them to be 
passed to the parliament. There is no process by law or practice in Egypt accord-
ing to which the line sectoral ministry shares its strategy with the parliament or the 
parliament has the role of endorsing the sectoral polices if they are not part of 
some piece of legislation.
Moreover, when the executive branch of the government supplements the pro-
posed law with FIA, the Plan and Budget Committee (PBC) has to be the main 
committee entitled for discussing these assessments besides the sectoral commit-
tees. Many of the Egyptian laws were presented without FIA and hence the PBC 
was not present in the discussions with the sectoral specialized committee on the 
subject matter. Moreover, the role of the PBC during the period (2001-2018) was 
very limited, i.e. it was not included in the referral decisions most of the times, 
with limited participation in the others. Further, the FIA was not fully conducted, 
covering only the law’s ratification year without any long-term prospects1. How-
ever, the burden of weak financial RIA is critical. For example, the annual bill of 
1 Based on a content analysis conducted by the authors regarding the law enacted in Egypt’s parliaments dur-
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60 a retroactive increase in pension allowances comes to 50 billion Egyptian pounds. 
Additionally, the state budget draft for FY 2018/2019 allocates 1.9 billion Egyp-
tian Pounds to pay the cash allowance for regular leave that the employees do not 
take as an impact from the Law of Civil Service (MoF, Egypt). 
In conclusion, this section indicated that MENA countries perform poorly in RIA 
practices, especially, when it comes to assessing the financial impact of legisla-
tions. Little attention is given to the due impact on budgeting work. This raises 
questions on how parliaments in the region can handle budgeting issues while 
their knowledge on the impact on fiscal sustainability is minimal. Also, the partial 
communication with citizens in the process of law-making raises skepticism con-
cerning how the available knowledge on policy impacts and public priorities and 
preferences informs the law-making process.
4 SECTION III: THE BUDGET LAW THROUGH A RIA LENS 
The two previous sections revealed that notwithstanding the diminishing fiscal 
discretion, the financial scrutiny on the impact of proposed laws remains weak. In 
this section, we delve into the process of making the budget law with the assump-
tion that what is missed in the law-making process may be captured during the 
budget process. 
4.1 BUDGET REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (BRIA)
Budget law is an interesting example to which to apply the RIA framework. By 
nature, it is enacted annually by the parliament and promulgated by the head of 
state. However, it has additional features in that it mirrors all the laws, decrees, 
and administrative orders in terms of their financial impact. To investigate the 
budget law through a RIA lens, we need to know the budget law status for the RIA 
with respect to five dimensions related to transparency, consultation with the pub-
lic, assessing the impact, accessibility to enacted budget laws, and capacity to 
review and amend figures in the budget law in future rounds of discussion. 
The Open Budget Index (OBI)2 provides answers for 145 questions related to the 
availability of budgetary data from different perspectives such as the availability 
and comprehensiveness of budget documents, the role and effectiveness of over-
sight institutions (legislature and state audit institutions) and budgetary openness. 
This makes the OBI a rich data set to construct a budgetary RIA (BRIA). We 
reviewed the questions and sorted them into five sub-indexes, where each of them 
profiles one of the five dimensions of RIA. Then, we went further into breaking 
down the sub-index into smaller sub-topics to enrich the analysis. Again, when-
ever, relevant, we did a third level breakdown to sub- factors. We utilized the 
2 The Open Budget Index is produced by the International Budget Partnership (IBP). The OBI assesses the 
three components of a budget accountability system: public availability of budget information; opportunities 
for the public to participate in the budget process; and the role and effectiveness of formal oversight institu-
tions, including the legislature and the national audit office. The majority of the survey questions assess what 
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61answers of 135 questions to fill in the BRIA, following the methodology of Open 
Budget Index of aggregating by the unweighted average scoring. Figure A7 shows 
the BRIA composition and mapping to RIA dimensions.
As figures A8a and b show, the BRIA performance varies among regions with 
observable discrepancies among the same region as demonstrated by table A4. It 
is observable that MENA is below the worldwide average in the global score of 
BRIA and in the five sub-indexes, with high discrepancy among its countries.
Figure A8b highlights the dimensions in which regions achieved their best. While 
there are variations among regions, all of them are doing well in their effort to 
allow public access to the budget law and its supplements compared to their per-
formance in other dimensions. The variations among regions are attributed to the 
number of budget documents that are available to the public in addition to the 
Budget Law itself. These documents include reviews on the budget implementa-
tion, the pre-budget statement, citizen budget, and oversight reports (IBP, 2017).
Least achieved in all regions is the effort to solicit results of the consultation with 
the public. It is interesting to observe that efforts conducted by the executives to 
provide information during the planning stage of the Budget Law and by legisla-
tures during the discussion in the parliaments, in addition to providing channels 
for information flows, have higher scores than that of consultations. This raises 
skepticism about the effectiveness of the transparency and openness efforts if they 
do not find ways to contribute to the process of law-making. 
Compared to other regions, the rank of MENA comes at the end for the dimen-
sions of consultation with the public, conducting impact assessment, and chal-
lenging regulations, while the region came second to lowest in two dimensions: 
transparency and accessing rules and regulations (figure A8b). 
Under the dimension of transparency, we can split the efforts conducted by the 
executives from those of the legislatures (table A5). The same applies for the 
dimension of soliciting results of public consultations. Worth mentioning that for 
soliciting the opinion of the public, the legislature’s contribution compared to the 
executive’s varies widely among regions, which can be attributed to differences in 
the political regime and practices. Yet, in MENA, both scores are the lowest 
worldwide. When it comes to the effort to solicit the results of consultation with 
the public to feed them into the law-making process, the international experience 
is skewed to the effort done by legislatures. Yet this role in MENA is completely 
absent from both the sides of the parliaments and the executives.
To analyze in depth the practice of impact of the budget law, we identified four 
attributes: availability of financial data, availability of the assumptions based on 
which the budget figures were produced, availability of data to assess the impact of 
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62 existing, and finally the availability of debt figures and medium-term fiscal outlook 
to have foresight on fiscal sustainability. Figure A9 reports on the results by region. 
It is interesting to see that except in MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa, the level of 
data availed by the executives to the parliaments is moderate to high. Regarding 
the availability of financial data, we can differentiate between those related to line 
items and those for the outcomes of policies to different socio-economic groups 
(table A6). Legislatures generally are less accurate about the budgetary impact on 
socio-economic groups, such as the poor, women and private sector. They are 
more informed about line items and the holistic fiscal trends. The knowledge of 
the legislatures in MENA about the financial data by line items and policy out-
comes is lower than that of all the other legislatures worldwide. 
Regarding the openness in sharing the assumptions used to build the budget fig-
ures, all regions showed low performance. Again, this raises some doubts about 
the quality and meaningfulness of assessments performed by the parliaments or 
the public where the assumptions underpinning the law-making of the budget are 
not fully shared. It is also interesting to observe that except for high income OECD 
countries, the capacity of legislatures to track the impact of the Budget Law on 
existing and new policies is relatively low. Finally, the availability of debt figures 
to conduct risk assessments is relatively acceptable across regions, right after the 
availability of financial data. 
Zooming in on our case studies, their BRIA scores are 43.9, 42.4, and 34.1 for 
Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia, respectively. This means that they are among the best 
performers in the region; compared to the low average score of MENA which 
stands at 18.1. As shown by figure A10, the three countries are in a proximately 
high status regarding providing the public with means to access the enacted budget 
law and its supplementary documents. Yet, they cluster around the status of mod-
erate for conducting impact assessment for the budget law. They differ consider-
ably in terms of data availed to the public in the planning and discussion stages, 
where Egypt scores the highest. None of them solicited the results of consultations 
with the public into feedback to the process of making the Budget Law.
The sub-index of challenging the trends and content of the Budget Law, reveals 
discrepancies in the capacities of the public and the legislatures to review and 
amend the budget law in next budget rounds, Jordan coming out top. Thanks to its 
massive reform in the subsidy component in the budget, its BRIA score in this 
dimension levelled high. 
From our micro analysis, we can tell that the legislatures in the three cases do not 
initiate any review of the budgetary figures. However, those changes cannot be 
implemented without being enacted by the legislatures. Therefore, we expect that 
Egypt’s score in the new round of OBI will go up with all the amendments intro-





















































































43 (1) 49-77 (2019)
634.2 EFFECTIVE TRANSPARENCY INDEXESBased on this, one could argue that the three countries are doing well in terms of 
BRIA, which could be consistent with their RIA scores shown in table A2. Yet, this 
is not consistent with tracked weaknesses depicted by the micro analysis for the 
law-making process especially for its relationship with FIA and the incomplete 
implementation of the legal decrees issued by their governments. This could be 
attributed to the methodology of constructing BRIA that uses the unweighted aver-
age which made the index skewed towards the extreme factors. Further, our BRIA 
results do not capture the dependency relationship among different dimensions. 
To construct effective transparency indexes, we used a more balanced measure of 
central tendency3: the geometric mean, with an exception of using the maximum 
value in some cases. The maximum values were used to deal with what could be 
named as “parallel alternatives”. In compositing some indices there are factors 
that could be alternatives to each other. In such cases, the maximum value tech-
nique was used, to have the highest score among these alternative factors to indi-
cate that the desired objective beyond this index was achieved.
We can explore more the importance of applying geometric means by recalling the 
example we provided above on the meaningless of one-way communicating with 
the public: availing data on the budget by the executives or the parliament, with-
out soliciting the public feedback into the law-making of the Budget Law. Also, 
what is the value of providing figures on the budget if the assumptions behind 
them in addition to other important complementary data are not shared. We think 
that when there is a value chain and dependency relationship, geometric mean is 
a much better option than the unweighted average. Accordingly, we used the sub-
dimensions of BRIA and calculated two indexes to capture the effectiveness of 
transparency taking into account this dependency relationships: one the Effective 
Transparency of Fiscal Sustainability (ETFS) and another on the Effective Trans-
parency on Policy Targeting (ETPT). The ETFS index covers all the dimensions 
required for effectively evaluating the transparency of fiscal sustainability data, 
including: availing related data through proper means of communications with the 
public and the parliaments as well as the measures to solicit the public opinions. 
The same applies for ETPT regarding the data, means and measures for both 
financial and non-financial issues for policy targeting by outcomes. In both 
indexes, availing meaningful data and openness to public are embedded. Table A7 
presents the results by regions.
It is interesting to observe that worldwide, the policy impact of the budget is still 
given lower importance than the issue of fiscal sustainability. Worth mentioning is 
that Eastern Europe outperforms Latin America in the fiscal sustainability index, 
3 Geometric means is being used when not much attention needs to be paid to the extreme values. In other 
words, the geometric mean, which was used in Human Development Index (HDI) for example, tries to reduce 
the influence of the extreme values. This means that geometric average will maintain the positioning of low-
performance or high-performance countries in a case in which they have an extreme high-level factor or low-
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64 and they exchange positions when it comes to policy targeting. Further, high income 
countries kept excelling, yet, with relatively lower scores in policy targeting. While 
results vary significantly within each region, the level of heterogeneity is at its min-
imum in High Income Countries-OECD. While High Income Countries-OECD are 
far ahead in the three dimensions, more effort to establish effective two-way com-
munication is still needed (figure A11). It can be said that shortcomings in effective 
communication are a worldwide issue. Yet, it is the culminating result of overlook-
ing the importance of internalizing the feedback of citizens into the law-making 
process. It is a key vehicle to enlighten the legislatures to take informed decisions 
for their societies in a way that fulfils the objectives of the Budget Law. 
MENA shows higher heterogeneity in performance for the two indexes of effec-
tive transparency than that of BRIA at large. The interesting result is that Jordan 
outshines Egypt and Tunisia, especially for ETPT, thanks to the recent application 
of program-based budgeting accompanied by the high level of data availing to the 
public. Tunisia, while doing much better than Egypt in availing data to the legis-
lature on policies and outcomes, has a means of communicating with the public 
that is relatively low performing, which pulled down the level of effective trans-
parency to the very low levels shown in table A8. 
The use of the geometric means pulls the status of Tunisia’s score downward, 
thereby providing an alert to the unfinished job related to availing the data to the 
public. For Egypt and Jordan, while they are doing moderately well in the dimen-
sion of communicating to the public, their final performance was impacted by the 
quality and comprehensiveness of data provided for the performance of an impact 
assessment.
5 SECTION IV: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The study focused on the budget law, as the overall framework that gathers 
together all the financial impacts of laws enacted by parliament. Legislatures must 
apply a comprehensive analytical approach including RIA and FIA when enacting 
new laws. Ratifying new laws with little scrutiny as to their impact on the budget 
structure and figures risks wasting scarce resources and jeopardizes the flexibility 
of the budget to respond to the emerging needs of the citizens. Greater attention 
should be given to the transparency of the process of law-making in terms of 
assessing the financial implications and of balancing them against expected ben-
efits using efficiency and effectiveness measures. 
The analysis profiled the MENA region in a comparative context that measures 
regional performances in implementing regulatory impact assessments. The study 
focused on three specific country cases to deepen the analysis. We found that leg-
islatures in MENA countries are experiencing diminishing fiscal room to influ-
ence the allocation of budget resources. In other words, the fiscal democracy 
index is dramatically low and even negative in some countries. The historical 
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65requisite level of oversight have impacted the budget structure and public debt 
burden. Most of the budget resources are devoted to meeting mandatory or oblig-
atory expenses. Nevertheless, this challenging situation has not pushed govern-
ments into focusing greater scrutiny on the financial implications of new laws 
through applying the good practices of law-making. Most of the new laws con-
tinue to be enacted by parliaments without deep knowledge of standard cost, effi-
ciency and effectiveness measures, let alone the future financial sustainability. 
In many of our interviews, officials from the MoFs and members of the parlia-
ments indicated that they postpone the conducting of FIA to a later stage when 
enacted laws are set into implementation. They perceive the process of budget 
making as the opportunity to assess in retrospect the FIA of the passed sectoral 
laws and their embedded policies. They may stretch the implementation of some 
laws over a longer time span to accommodate their financial impact. That is to say, 
legislators conduct RIA in retrospect. Additionally, they negotiate the budget 
requests, reflecting the enacted policies, to control for negative impacts on fiscal 
sustainability. The study has challenged this practice by scrutinizing the process 
of making the budget law through a RIA lens. We utilized the rich set of data of 
the OBI to construct the RIA index that allows screening the process of budget 
making through the whole steps of law-making, starting with planning and ending 
with publication in the Official Gazette. MENA did not perform well. Even the 
moderate scores of the three case studies went down when the analysis shifted to 
count for balanced performance. 
We conclude this study by stressing the responsibility of legislatures to improve 
the fiscal democracy index. The parliamentary fiscal functions must be operated in 
an integrated manner. This means that executives should provide information 
about the financial impact of the proposed laws. The legislatures should also 
request such an assessment. They have to protect the budget from those financially 
unassessed laws and policies.
Also, as we built on OBI to establish the budgetary index of RIA, the survey could 
be utilized as an advocacy tool for conducting RIA. OBI has gained a lot of impor-
tance over the years and has acquired advocacy power (de Renzio and Masud, 
2011). It could be a good tool to encourage the mentioned responsibilities. Adding 
a few questions to make sure that each of the executives and legislatures perform 
their responsibilities for RIA will voice this issue. Additionally, producing indexes 
for effective transparency would stress the balance that should be attained among 
different attributes for transparency. The only average measuring of transparency 
hides critical policy messages.
Disclosure statement 

























































































Overall deficit/surplus in MENA Arab countries (2009-2016)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Surplus/deficit 
(US $Billion) -46.9 7.4 94.0 139.9 67.2 53.4 -213.8 -234.5
% GDP -2.6 0.4 3.9 5.3 2.5 1.9 -8.8 -10.0
Oil countries4 
(US $ Billion) -22.0 36.6 127.1 182.2 118.9 100.7 -185.9 -191.3




-24.9 -29.2 -33.1 -42.3 -51.8 -47.3 -27.9 -43.1
% GDP -5.7 -6.1 -7.3 -8.4 -9.8 -8.5 -4.9 -8.5
Source: Joint Arab Economic Report, Multiple issues (2014-2017), Arab Monetary Fund.
Table a2




























Algeria 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.2
Bahrain 0 0 0 1 1 0.2 2.2
Comoros 0.6 0.6 0.8 0 0 0 2
Djibouti 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0.2
Iraq 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Jordan 1 0.6 0.2 0 0 0 1.8
Kuwait 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.4
Lebanon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Libya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mauritania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Morocco 1 1 1 0 0 0 3
Oman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Qatar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sudan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tunisia 1 1 0 1 0 0 3
United Arab 
Emirates 0.6 0.2 0.2 1 1 0.2 3.2
Palestine 0.2 0.6 0 0 0 0 0.8
Yemen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Global Indicators of Regulatory Impact Assessment Governance, 2016.
4 Oil Arab countries are the Arab petroleum net exporting countries and are represented by members of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), in addition to Iraq, Algeria, Libya, and Yemen 
(Arab Monetary Fund, 2017).
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67Table a3




































































Discrepancy in Budgetary Regulatory Impact Assessment (BRIA)1,2,3 performance 
by region
BRIA Coefficient of Variation (CV), %
East Asia & Pacific 39.4  54.0
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 39.0  31.7
Latin America & Caribbean 37.7  43.3
Middle East & North Africa 18.1 105.5
South Asia 33.7  12.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 21.4  77.9
High Income: OECD Countries 54.8  14.2
Grand total 32.8  57.8
1-The unweighted average was used to aggregate the index-value at the regional level.
2-Reference year 2017.
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68 Table a5
Legislatures and executives contribution to effectively open to the public1,2
Regions 
Transparency dimension Consultation dimension











East Asia & 
Pacific 33.8 19.8 27.6  5.2 14.1  9.6
Eastern Europe 
& Central Asia 19.8 27.7 26.4  0.8 11.9  6.3
Latin America & 
Caribbean 19.3 26.4 25.3  1.0  7.3  4.2
Middle East & 
North Africa 16.4  4.9 10.5  0.0  0.0  0.0
South Asia 34.2 11.1 22.3  2.7  0.0  1.4
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 20.0 18.5 20.6  0.0  2.8  1.4
High Income: 
OECD Countries 23.5 58.3 47.4 11.6 32.4 22.0
Grand total 22.5 23.4 24.9  2.2  8.9  5.5




Availability of financial data1,2
Availability of financial data
Line item data Program data Total sub-factor
East Asia & Pacific 59.5 58.9 59.5
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 71.6 55.1 63.2
Latin America & Caribbean 67.4 67.2 67.7
Middle East & North Africa 27.8 21.4 24.5
South Asia 68.3 69.8 69.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 33.4 26.5 29.9
High Income: OECD Countries 85.8 82.9 84.7
Sub-factor total 54.9 49.0 52.0
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69Table a7


















East Asia & Pacific 11.8 163.8 10.6 139.2
Eastern Europe & 
Central Asia 10.7 123.3  9.1 123.9
Latin America & 
Caribbean 10.0 156.1 10.4 155.1
Middle East & North 
Africa  3.0 202.2  3.2 229.2
South Asia  3.2 184.5  4.2 107.7
Sub-Saharan Africa  5.2 196.6  5.4 223.6
High Income: OECD 
Countries 28.2  50.2 25.0  66.5
Grand total  9.5 151.4  9.0 153.0
1-Unweighted average was used to aggregate the index-value at the regional level.
2-Reference year 2017.
3-The used coefficient of variation was calculated across countries within the mentioned regions.
Sources: authors’ analysis.
Table a8
Effective Transparency of Fiscal Sustainability (ETFS) and Effective Transpar-


























Egypt 20.8 0.0 8.6  9.8 20.8 0.0  0.1  7.0
Jordan 52.0 0.0 1.3 17.8 52.0 0.0 17.8 23.3
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70 CHARTS AND FIGURES
Figure a1









1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Advanced economies Emerging market and developing economies
Emerging and developing Asia Emerging and developing Europe
Latin America and the Caribbean Middle East and North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Source: drawn based on World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, April 2018, International 
Monetary Fund.
Figure a2























2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Source: drawn based on Joint Arab Economic Report, Multiple issues (2014-2017), Arab 
Monetary Fund.
6 General government gross debt consists of all liabilities that payment(s) of interest and/or principal by the 
central government to the creditor at a date or dates in the future. This includes debt liabilities in the form of 
SDRs, currency and deposits, debt securities, loans, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee schemes, 
and other accounts payable (WEO, April 2018).
7 A Box and Whisker plot that provides a measure of dispersion of the overall deficit in all Arab countries 
over the stated period. This chart is not concerned with the individual performance of each Arab country. The 
upper and lower limits of the boxes represent the upper and lower quartiles, so the box spans the interquartile 
range whereas the horizontal line crossing the box represents the median, and finally the two lines outside the 
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71Figure a3
Jordan, Egypt, and Tunisia performance in fiscal democracy index (2010-2017) 



















Jordan Egypt Tunisia Egypt TunisiaJordan
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source: authors’ calculations.
Figure a4
Nominal growth10 of the components of government spending in Jordan, Egypt, 















Source: Ministry of Finance, Egypt; Government Budget Department, Jordan; Ministry of Finance 
Portal, Tunisia.
8 The formula for the index is, ]1- (Mandatory Spending/ revenues) [100; where Mandatory Spending equals 
spending on wages and salaries, pensions, and interest payments.
9 In Fiscal Democracy Index with subsidies, subsidies are added as one of the government mandatory spending. 
10 Nominal growth refers to the percentage change in the components of public spending in the ending period 
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72 Figure a5
Debt trends in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia (2010-2017)

















2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Egypt Jordan Tunisia
Source:  (a) IMF (2018). 
(b) MoF.gov.eg. (2018); Ministry of Finance Portal, Tunisia.
Figure a6
RIA indicators by regions
(a) Regulatory governance score11 (b) Transparency of rulemaking,12 %
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Percentage of countries
(c) Public comments on proposed regulations 
are requested
(d) Conduct regulatory impact assessment
Proportion of economies Proportion of economies
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South Asia
East Asia & Pacific
Europe & Central Asia
High income: OECD
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Middle East & North Africa
South Asia
East Asia & Pacific
Latin America & Carribbean




Source: calculated based on Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance, 2016, World Bank.
11 Regulatory Governance Score captures how policymakers interact with stakeholders when shaping regula-
tions affecting business communities. Concerned stakeholders could be professional associations, civic groups 
or foreign investors. The score ranges from 0 (worst performance) to 5 (best performance) (World Bank, 2018).
12 Transparency of rulemaking is one of the sub-indices of the Global Regulatory Governance Index. This sub-
index is concerned with whether regulators commonly communicate with the public about proposed regula-
tions, and if so, how. Communication could be through unified websites where all (or substantially all) new 
regulations are posted before adoption, websites specific to particular ministries, public gazettes, federal jour-
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75Figure a10





















Effective Transparency of Fiscal Sustainability (ETFS) and Effective Transpar-
ency of Policy Targeting (ETPT) sub-dimensions by region
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